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ii

Case No. 20081065-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Michael Willam Kissell,
Petitioner/ Appellant,
vs.

State of Utah,
Respondent/ Appellee.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4103(2)(e) (Supp 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the post-conviction court err when it held that Kissell7s post-conviction
petition was both untimely and procedurally barred?
Standard of Review. The "underlying issue" in this case "is one of statutory
interpretation, which we review for correctness, affording no deference to [the]
lower court's legal determinations." State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, \ 6,203 P.3d 984.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated § 78-35a-106 (Supp. 2006) and Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-35a-107 (Supp. 2006) are determinative of this appeal and are attached as
addenda to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 27, 2004, Kissell was charged with one count of forcible sexual
abuse of a child, thirty-four counts of dealing in harmful material to a child, and one
count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. R. 69-87. Kissell subsequently
pleaded guilty to five counts of dealing harmful material to a child; in exchange, the
remaining charges were dropped. R. 93-98. On April 5,2005, Kissell was sentenced
to five terms of 0-5 years in prison, and the trial court ordered the terms to run
consecutively. R. 125-26.
Kissell did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, nor did he appeal
from his sentence. R. 6. Instead, Kissell's first challenge came on July 14, 2006,
when Kissell filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act
(PCRA). R. 5-12. In his supporting memorandum, Kissell claimed that the trial
court had violated his constitutional rights when it ordered the sentences to run
consecutively. R. 13-28.
The State moved to dismiss the petition for two reasons. R. 60-67. First, the
State argued that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations; and second,
2

the State claimed that the petition was procedurally barred because Kissell could
have raised these claims on direct appeal. R. 60-67. In his response, Kissell
implicitly acknowledged that the petition was untimely, but nevertheless asked the
court to excuse his late filing under the interests of justice exception to the PCRA's
statute of limitations. R. 170-75. With respect to the State's procedural bar
argument, Kissell argued that the court should review his claims due to unusual
circumstances and the potential for an "obvious injustice." R. 175-78.
The post-conviction court ruled that the petition was both time-barred and
procedurally barred, and it then rejected Kissell's claim that any exception to those
limitations applied. R. 189-91. The post-conviction court accordingly dismissed his
petition. R. 189-91. Kissell appeals that dismissal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On appeal, Kissell does not address the grounds for the post-conviction
court's dismissal of his petition. Rather, he only addresses his underlying merits
claim regarding the trial court's alleged errors at sentencing. But the court did not
address the merits of Kissell's claims in its dismissal decision, instead resting solely
on its conclusion that Kissell's petition was both untimely and procedurally barred.
Insofar as Kissell has not challenged either of those rulings on appeal, the dismissal
must be affirmed.

3

ARGUMENT
I.
KISSELL HAS NOT CHALLENGED THE POST-CONVICTION
COURTS BASIS FOR DISMISSING HIS PETITION
Kissell claims that the trial court violated his constitutional rights when it
ordered him to serve consecutive sentences. Aplt. Br. 11-28. This claim should be
rejected, however, because it fails to challenge the actual basis for the postconviction court's decision to dismiss his petition.
KisselFs petition was brought under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act
(PCRA). See generally Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-101 to -405 (Supp. 2009). Under the
PCR A, a petitioner is allowed to challenge a conviction or sentence after exhausting
all other legal remedies. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102 (Supp. 2009). A "petition for
post-conviction relief 'is a collateral attack of a conviction and/or sentence and is
not a substitute for direct appellate review/ ,, State v. Myers, 2004 UT 31, Tf 11, 94
P.3d 211 (citation omitted). As such, a petitioner does not have an unlimited right to
pursue post-conviction claims. Instead, petitions filed under the PCRA are subject
to a number of statutorily-prescribed limitations.
In this case, the trial court held that two particular PCRA limitations barred
Kissell's claim.
First, the trial court held that Kissell's claim was untimely under the PCRA's
statute of limitations. R. 189-91. Under the statute of limitations in effect at the time
4

of this petition, Kissell was "only" entitled to relief under the PCRA "if the petition
[was] filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-35a-107(l) (Supp. 2006). In cases such as this one, where the petitioner did not
file a direct appeal, the cause of action accrued on "the last day for filing an appeal."
Id. § 78-35a-107(2)(a).
Kissell was sentenced on April 5,2005. R. 125-26. Thus, the last day for filing
an appeal was May 5, 2005. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). He therefore had until May 5,
2006, to file his post-conviction petition. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(2)(a) (Supp.
2006). Kissell did not file his petition until July 14,2006, however, so the trial court
correctly held that this petition was barred by the statute of limitations. R. 189-91.
Second, the trial court also held that Kissell7s petition was procedurally
barred. R. 189-91. Under the statute in effect at the time of this petition, a petitioner
was "not eligible for relief... upon any ground that:... (c) could have been but was
not raised at trial or on appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l) (Supp. 2006). This
restriction exists "because a petition for post-conviction relief 'is a collateral attack of
a conviction and/or sentence and is not a substitute for direct appellate review/"
and it "'applies to all claims, including constitutional questions/" Myers, 2004 UT
31, Tf 11 (citation omitted).
In this case, Kissell could have challenged the legality of his sentence by filing
a direct appeal. As he repeatedly acknowledged below, however, he did not appeal
5

his sentence. R. 6, 10, 165, 172. The trial court therefore correctly held that the
petition was procedurally barred. R. 189-91.
In his brief to this Court, Kisell does not acknowledge either ground for
dismissal, let alone demonstrate that the trial court incorrectly applied these
statutory restrictions in this case. Aplt. Br. 11-29. With respect to the statute of
limitations, for example, Kissell does not claim that his petition should have been
deemed timely through use of a tolling mechanism, nor does he renew his claim that
the petition's untimeliness should have been excused under the interest of justice
exception. With respect to the procedural bar, Kissell likewise fails to renew his
claim that the good cause or unusual circumstances exceptions applied to this case,
nor does he ever argue that the procedural bar was inapplicable because he could
not have raised these claims below.
Rather than addressing the grounds by which his petition was dismissed,
Kissell instead simply argues that his sentence was constitutionally invalid. Aplt.
Br. 11-29. As set forth in the PCRA, however, the PCRA is "the sole remedy for any
person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has
exhausted all other legal remedies." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102 (Supp. 2009). And
as set forth in the trial court's unchallenged ruling, Kissell7s petition was invalid
under the PCRA because it was both untimely and procedurally barred.

6

Under Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant's brief
must"contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial
court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."
As Utah courts have frequently reiterated, "a reviewing court is entitled to
have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research." State v. Gomez, 2002 UT120, | 20,63 P.3d 72 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988) (in turn quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784
(111. App. Ct. 1981))). Thus, when the appellant fails to present any relevant
authority, the reviewing court will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003
UT 24, f 12,69 P.3d 1278 (rejecting prosecutorial misconduct challenge). Similarly,
"[w]hen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [the court will] decline to
reach the merits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, f 12,52 P.3d 467. An appellant
must, in addition to citing cases, "explain why . . . the cases cited compel this court
to reverse the district c o u r t . . . . " Id.
Where, as here, an appellant fails to attack the basis of the judgment below,
his argument is inadequately briefed and the judgment should be affirmed on that
basis. Cf. State v. Sorenson, 2004 UT App 381U, at *1 (affirming where Sorenson
failed to challenge two of three bases for trial court ruling: "Sorenson does not
7

challenge these determinations on appeal and, accordingly, we find no reason to
reverse the trial court's denial of Sorenson's motion to suppress"); accord San Antonio
Press, Inc. v. Custom Bilt Machinery, 852 S.W.12d 64,65 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("When a
separate and independent ground that supports a judgment is not challenged on
appeal, the appellate court must affirm"); James v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc., 744 P.2d
689,694 (Ariz. 1986) (affirming judgment below on an uncontested issue); Shraederv.
Eli Lily & Co., 639 N.E.2d 258,264 (Ind. 1994) (affirming judgment below "[bjecause
appellants have not successfully challenged one of the independent grounds
supporting summary judgment").
In short, Kissell was required to comply with the PCRA's requirements in
order to obtain relief. The trial court ruled that Kissell had not done so, and Kissell
has not challenged that ruling on appeal. As such, his appeal should be rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal
of this petition.

8

Respectfully submitted September 9 , 2009.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

RYANT)/TENNEY

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Respondent

9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on September _ _ , 2009, two copies of the foregoing brief were
\3 mailed D hand-delivered to:
Andrew Fitzgerald
55 East 100 South
Moab, UT 84532
A digital copy of the brief was also included: B'Yes D No

U V U L J I X . *> cy-w

AA^.

>o\.

Addenda

§ 78-35a-106 (Supp. 2006) Preclusion of relief-Exception
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or
could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction
relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

§ 78~35a-107 (Supp. 2006) Statute of limitations for postconviction relief
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year
after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the
following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of
conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the
case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court
or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the
decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is
filed; or
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based.
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a
petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations.
(4) Sections 77-19-8, 78-12-35, and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period
established in this section.

